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Abstract
Classic models of reputation consider an agent taking costly actions to affect a single, homo-
geneous audience’s beliefs about his ability, preferences or other characteristic. However, in many
economic settings, agents must maintain a reputation with multiple parties with diverse interests. In
this paper we study reputation incentives for an agent who faces two audiences with opposed prefer-
ences. We ask if the existence of multiple audiences per se changes reputation incentives. Further,
should the agent deal with the different audiences commonly or separately? Our analysis yields some
new qualitative insights. Specifically, the presences of heterogeneous audiences is more likely to lead
the agent towards “pooling” equilibria in which he takes an intermediate compromise action. Instead,
dealing with only one audience leads the agent to cater towards that audience’s preferences, giving
rise to a “separating” outcome or pooling on some extreme action. We analyze the welfare implica-
tions, and show that the agent most prefers that both audiences commonly observe all the actions that
he takes.
In our setting, reputation acts as an informal contract that enforces desirable behavior through
future continuation payoffs. Our analysis highlights that the presence of multiple heterogeneous au-
diences can, naturally, lead these rewards to be non-monotonic in an agent’s reputation. We show dif-
ferent ways that this non-monotonicity arises. In an infinite horizon setting, it can emerge through en-
dogenous interactions between the audiences, through equilibrium expectations of the agent’s choice
of action. It can also arise, perhaps more trivially, through direct payoff interactions.
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1 Introduction
The problem of maintaining a reputation with multiple parties who have diverse interests arises in many
economic settings. For example, a manager’s promotion in an organization may depend on the eval-
uations of two superiors who have conflicting interests, a political candidate works to gain support of
his local constituency as well as the central party leadership, a credit rating agency’s payoff depends di-
rectly on payment from issuers but indirectly on its credibility among investors. The central question that
we ask in this paper is how the existence of multiple audiences with heterogeneous preferences affects
incentives to build a reputation.
Most of the literature on reputation studies reputation formation with a single audience with homo-
geneous preferences.1 Perhaps, the leading example in the literature is that of a firm of a privately known
type, making quality choices, and building a reputation with a consumer base that uniformly prefers
higher quality to lower quality. In contrast, we want to think about horizontal quality differentiation, and
reputation formation when the consumer base may have heterogeneous or opposed quality preferences.
The presence of multiple audiences raises several new questions. Fundamentally, does the existence
of multiple audiences per se change the agent’s incentive to build a reputation compared to when she
faces a single audience? With multiple audiences, agents may be able to interact separately or commonly
with each audience, and thus build a common, public reputation, or separate, private ones.2 What dif-
ference does this make to outcomes? We answer these questions by studying an environment in which a
single agent (of a private type) builds a reputation with two audiences with opposed preferences over an
infinite-horizon.
We find that, when there are multiple audiences, equilibrium behavior depends crucially on whether
the agent’s actions are observed separately or commonly by the audiences. Reputational incentives are
qualitatively different in these two cases. Under separate observations, compromise is never optimal in
that agents do not take intermediate actions, but rather prefer extreme actions. On the other hand, under
common observations, catering to an audience, by choosing that audience’s favored (extreme) action, is
much harder to sustain. Finally, an environment with a single audience is qualitatively similar to one with
multiple audiences with separate observations. This last result should not be surprising: If the actions of
1There are exceptions. Notably, Gertner et al. (1988) consider a firm that would like to signal to lenders that is low cost,
while concerned that this will cause product market rivals to be more aggressive. Their analysis highlights that pooling equilibria
might naturally arise. More recently, Bouvard and Levy (2010) and Frenkel (2011) consider credit rating agencies who would
like issuers to believe they are lax, and investors to believe they are tough. Intermediate reputations can be optimal.
Somewhat further from our analysis, where an agent’s type is one-dimensional and an agent takes two actions in each period,
Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) develop a model where an agent’s type is two-dimensional. In their model, different audiences
care about orthogonal dimensions, but the agent has only a single action with which to signal to both audiences.
2The question of dealing with different audiences separately or commonly has been explored in related literatures. Notably,
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and more recently Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) address this question in a cheap talk setting. In
the classic reputation literature, we know of no paper addressing this issue, though Fingleton and Raith (2005) examine career
concerns of bargainers seeking to develop reputations for the quality of their information on rivals’ reserve prices and contrast
open- and closed-door bargaining.
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the agent are not observed by both audiences, then the agent can build independent, private reputations
with each. In effect, he faces two independent strategic situations, each with a single audience.
The model delivers a clear normative result: The agent always prefers that the audiences commonly
observe all actions. In our setting, catering to one audience harms the other audience, and so generates
no additional payoffs but does involve additional costs. Ensuring that audiences commonly observe the
agent’s actions can, in effect, allow the agent to credibly commit not to engage in wasteful pandering
behavior (and under separate observation, such a commitment would not be as credible since each agent
only observes part of what the agent does in each period). Moreover, common observation can allow for
pooling equilibria that feature compromise but we show that this can only arise when it is more efficient
than the alternative, where, reputation effects do not discipline behavior and there is separation. Thus, in
this case also, the agent prefers that audiences commonly observe his actions.
Reputation enforces desirable behavior much like a contract (see MacLeod (2007)), but where the
terms of the contract arise endogenously as continuation values that can be sustained in equilibrium.
The “rewards” in the implicit contract depend on audience preferences and expectations of the actions
the agent will take in equilibrium. A subtlety, in the dynamic setting is that an endogenous interaction
arises between the separate audiences, through the agent’s choice of actions. This payoff interaction
of the audiences can make an intermediate reputation more attractive to the agent than an extreme one.
Consequently, pooling equilibria arise, in which agents take a compromise action that helps maintain
uncertainty about her type (and an intermediate reputation).
A key theoretical insight here is that the presence of multiple audiences in a dynamic setting changes
reputational incentives qualitatively compared to the single audience-case, because it affects the curvature
of the agent’s rewards as a function of her reputation. In particular, the endogenously determined value
of a reputation to the agent can be non-monotonic in the current reputation level, making intermediate
levels of reputation optimal.
Interestingly, we find this effect does not arise in the two-period version of our model. With only
two periods, the return to reputation is always linear, pushing the agent to choose extreme actions in
equilibrium in order to get an extreme reputation. However, “compromise” arises in an extension of the
two-period model where we impose complementarity in the audience’s payoffs exogenously.
To establish these results, we analyze some related models. In our baseline environment, an agent
interacts with two audiences over an infinite horizon. The two audiences have opposed preferences over
the agent’s action choices. In every period, the agent produces a good or service that requires two tasks.
The agent has three choices for each task–an action that is favored by one audience, an action favored
by the other audience, and a compromise action. The agent can be one of two privately known types:
Each type is inherently favored by one audience since it can take the audience’s most preferred action
at a lower cost. The agent’s type is realized at the start of the game and is fixed forever. Audiences are
uninformed about the agent’s type, and share a common prior belief about it at the start of the game.
2
M
ay
 24
, 2
01
2
Dr
aft
 ve
rsi
on
As is standard in the reputation literature, we assume that the audiences are myopic and risk neutral
and therefore reward the agent based on their expectation of the agent’s action. The agent’s payoff is
a function of the payments it receives from each audience. We want to allow for the possibility of the
agent building common and separate reputations. To this end, we study two different environments: One
in which the audiences commonly observe both of the agent’s tasks, and another in which each audience
sees only one of the tasks of the agent. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibria in this setting. A
leading example of this environment might be an organizational setting, in which a manager reports to
a Finance Director and a Marketing Director. The manager is inherently suited for either a quantitative
Finance project, or a more qualitative Marketing project. A compromise project is one that involves a mix
of these two skills. In each period, the manager must undertake two projects. The Finance Director and
the Marketing Director prefer finance and marketing projects respectively. The manager’s compensation
is a function of the ratings that she receives from each Director. Internal review systems might be design
choices that affect the extent to which the Finance and Marketing Directors can observe different aspects
of the manager’s performance.
In this baseline model, we establish that compromise arises in equilibrium with two audiences and
common observations, but is impossible with a single audience, or under separate observations. We also
show that catering to an audience, by pooling on that audience’s favored action, is hard to sustain with
two audiences and common observations. The intuition is that catering to one audience implies losing
the support of the other. In particular, we show that catering to both audiences (choosing the favored task
for each audience) is impossible with two audiences and common observations. Analogously, we find
that non-reputational (or separating) equilibria are easier to sustain under common observations. The
intuition is that with common observations, it is easier for the agent to convince one audience about how
she will interact with the other audience as well. Full separation is less credible if the audiences cannot
observe both tasks of the agent.
Since observability seems to crucially impact the nature of reputation incentives in the presence of
multiple audiences, we are led naturally to ask questions regarding design or welfare. We compare the
equilibrium payoffs across equilibrium regimes, and find that, under separate observations, the agent
strictly prefers the non-reputational, fully separating equilibrium to any other reputational equilibrium.
Indeed, the agent would strictly prefer his less favorite action to be very costly so that he is never expected
to cater in equilibrium. The opposite is true for common observations: In this case, whenever feasible,
the agent strictly prefers the reputational (pooling) equilibria with compromise. Further, we find that,
among all equilibria under both separate and common observations, the agent most prefers the pooling
equilibrium with full compromise (whenever it is feasible).
The pooling equilibria in the infinite horizon model have the feature that pooling sustains the uncer-
tainty about the agent’s type in the long-run, and pooling remains optimal.3 This implies that the learning
3In Section 4.1, we discuss, in detail, the relationship between our results and the literature on type-based reputation.
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dynamics are not very interesting in this environment: Either there is no learning in equilibrium or types
are learnt with certainty. This may make the reader wonder whether dynamics play any role at all in the
reputational equilibria. To address this question, we present a two-period analog of the baseline model
and show that compromise no longer arises in equilibrium.
We extend the two-period model to show that compromise can occur in equilibrium, if we impose
(exogenously) some complementarity between the payoffs from the two audiences in the agent’s utility
function. Dynamics thus seem to play an important, but subtle role here: The payoff complementarity
emerges endogenously in an infinite-horizon model, and makes the value of reputation non-monotonic
in the reputation level.
We explore further this insight that the shape of the value of reputation affects reputational incen-
tives. We do this directly by analyzing reputation formation by an agent with two audiences in a setting
without any dynamics or asymmetric information. We present a two-period career concerns model, in
which we depart from the standard setting by allowing the agent’s payoff to be a general function of her
reputation (rather than a linear function.) We discuss simple micro-foundations for such reward func-
tions, and establish that some well-known career concerns results (Holmstro¨m, 1982/99) no longer hold.
In particular, we find that reputation incentives are not independent of reputation level, but can vary
non-monotonically with reputation and that incentives may be non-monotonic in the precision of prior
beliefs. Martinez (2009), Casas-Arce (2010) and more recent work by Miklos-Thal and Ullrich (2012)
examine some applications of such career concerns models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the baseline model. In
Section 3, we characterize the reputational and non-reputational equilibria, and present the welfare com-
parisons. Section 4 contains a two-period version of our model to explain the role of dynamics in a
setting with multiple audiences. In Section 5, we further investigate the role of the shape of the returns-
to-reputation in determining reputation incentives. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Multiple Audiences
We present an infinite horizon model with two audiences who have opposed preferences for an agent’s
actions. As in the standard approach to reputation, knowing the agent’s type is helpful for predicting the
agent’s action. The agent can be one of two (privately known) types θ ∈ {θL, θR}. His type is realized
at the start of the game, and is fixed forever. In each period, the agent works for two audiences, L and R
respectively. The audiences are uninformed of the agent’s type. At the start of the game, the audiences
have a common belief λ0, where λ0 is the probability of the agent being of type θ = θL. An agent of
type θL is inherently more favored by L, since he can (and is more likely) to take actions preferred by L
at lower cost, as described below. Similarly, an agent of type θR is more favored by R.
Time is discrete, and the horizon infinite. In every period, the agent produces a good or service that
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requires two actions (a1, a2) ∈ {aL, aM , aR} × {aL, aM , aR}. The cost of an action depends on the
agent’s type: For an agent of type θL (θR), the aL (aR) action is costless, the action aR (aL) is very
costly, and aM has intermediate cost. Formally, we assume the following: For θ ∈ {θL, θR},
c((aL, aL), θL) = c((aR, aR), θR) = 0
c((aM , aL), θL) = c(aL, aM , θL) = c((aM , aR), θR) = c((aR, aM ), θR) = c
c((aR, aL), θL) = c((aL, aR), θL) = c((aL, aR), θR) = c((aR, aL), θR) = C
c((aM , aR), θL) = c((aR, aM ), θL) = c((aM , aL), θR) = c((aL, aM ), θR) = c+ C
c((aM , aM ), θL) = c((aM , aM ), θR) = 2c
c((aR, aR), θL) = c((aL, aL), θR) = 2C
For each type, say θL, we interpret the costless action aL as one that the agent is inherently better suited
for and therefore finds easy to do. The opposite extreme action aR is very costly. We refer to the action
aM as a “compromise” —an action that is of intermediate and symmetric cost for both types of agents.
Formally C ≥ c > 0. In the organizational application, we can think of a manager reporting to a Finance
Director and a Marketing Director. Managers are required to complete two projects in every period, and
a manager is inherently suited for either a quantitative Finance project, or a more qualitative Marketing
project. A “compromise project” is one that involves a mix of these two skills.
Signal Structure: We compare two different environments: We consider an environment with “separate
observations”, in which, the L-audience observes a1, the R-audience observes a2. In this situation, as far
as reputation-building is concerned, the agent effectively faces two separate audiences. We also consider
the polar case of “common observations” in which both audiences observe both action choices of the
agent.
Payoffs: The two audiences L and R have opposed preferences. In keeping with the literature on rep-
utation, we assume that the audiences are myopic, and risk neutral, and we characterize the payments
by each audience, given its expectation of the agent’s action.4 We denote the L- (and R-) audience’s
payments to the agent given that it expects the agent to take action a∗ by wL(a∗) (and wR(a∗)). The
preferences for the audiences are such that the L-audience prefers aL to aM to aR. The opposite is true
for the R-audience. Formally, we assume:
wL(aR, aR) = w
R(aL, aL) = 0
wL(aM , aR) = w
L(aR, aM ) = w
R(aM , aL) = w
R(aL, aM ) = m
wL(aR, aL) = w
L(aL, aR) = w
R(aL, aR) = w
R(aR, aL) = 1
4Typically, this is justified by supposing that there are many constituents in the audience who bid for a single unit of
good/service and so pay their full valuation. Qualitatively similar results follow from assuming that rather than each audience
paying its full valuation in each period, it pays a constant fraction of its valuation.
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wL(aM , aM ) = w
R(aM , aM ) = 2m
wL(aM , aL) = w
L(aL, aM ) = w
R(aM , aR) = w
R(aR, aM ) = 1 +m
wL(aL, aL) = w
R(aR, aR) = 2,
where m ∈ (0, 1). The agent’s payoff in any period t is a function of the payments it receives from each
audience. We suppose that the agent’s per-period utility is given by
ut = w
L
t + w
R
t ,
where wLt and wRt are the payments received from the L and R-audiences respectively.5 We assume
a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The agent’s total payoff is therefore ∑∞τ=1 δτ−1ut. In the organization
application, we interpret u as the overall payoff of the manager, which is a function of the ratings that
the she receives from each of the two Directors.
Strategies: For the baseline model, we restrict attention to pure strategies. Note that with separate ob-
servations, the beliefs held by the two audiences can be different. Therefore, the relevant state for the
agent is given by a pair of beliefs (λL, λR). Let aθ(λL, λR) denote a pure strategy of an agent of type
θ: it specifies the pair of actions aθ ∈ {aL, aM , aR} × {aL, aM , aR} an agent of type θ will play, given
prior beliefs (λL, λR) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1].
Solution Concept: Pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), where the state is given by (λL, λR).
Note that the assumption of Markov perfection, common in the literature (for example, Mailath and
Samuelson (2001)), ensures that the agent’s incentives are “reputational” in the sense that the agent takes
actions to affect audiences’ beliefs about his type. Without the restriction to Markov perfection, repeated
game constructions can allow standard folk-theorem effects to arise.
Off-Equilibrium Beliefs: In a pure strategy equilibrium, it is clear that characterizing equilibrium re-
quires us to specify off-equilibrium beliefs in case of a deviation. Most deviations appeal to one type
rather than another and so the standard forward induction refinement D1 suggests that almost all de-
viations would lead to some degenerate beliefs.6 We make the following standard assumption about
off-path beliefs: Once the posterior belief of an audience becomes extreme (degenerate), the audience
stops updating.7
5It is a straightforward extension to allow for the audiences to be asymmetric in their influence on the agent’s payoffs. For
a discussion, please see Section 3.4.
6An exception is that under common observation if the agent is anticipated to choose (aL, aR) it seems perverse to update
beliefs if (aR, aL) is observed instead.
7This assumption has the immediate implication that in a Markov perfect equilibrium, agents will not take any costly actions
once beliefs become extreme, further that future action choices will have no impact on the future beliefs of the audiences. This
may seem unappealing in practice.
If we suppose, instead, that audiences become disabused if they observe inconsistent behavior at degenerate beliefs, so that
off-equilibrium deviations must be maintained beyond a single period, we still get qualitatively similar results. Details are
available from the authors.
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3 Analysis: Reputational and Non-reputational Equilibria
At any particular state, there are nine different pure strategies (a1, a2) for each agent, leading to 81
possible strategy profiles. Fortunately, the problem simplifies considerably: The first simplification stems
from the fact that with pure strategies, the learning process of the audiences is very straightforward.
When agents choose pure strategies, two cases can arise. First, pooling can arise, in which case the state,
or, rather, one dimension of the two-dimensional (λL, λR)-state, remains unchanged–no learning occurs
in equilibrium. Otherwise, there is separation and the beliefs becomes degenerate so that λL, λR or both
become either 0 or 1.8 This means that we can restrict attention to equilibrium play in the states (1, 1),
(0, 0), and (λ0, λ0) (for both common and separate observation), and {(λ0, 0), (λ0, 1), (0, λ0), (1, λ0)},
for separate observations.
Further, note that when types separate in equilibrium, they will do so by playing their costless actions;
i.e., θL plays aL and θR plays aR (or (aL, aL) and (aR, aR) respectively, under common observations).
The reasoning is a little subtle inasmuch as it requires an assumption on off-equilibrium beliefs: How-
ever, at any separating equilibrium it is reasonable (and consistent with forward induction reasoning) to
suppose that a deviation to aL (aR) reflects that the agent’s type is θL (θR). Since separating leads to the
same beliefs (or continuation values), regardless of the choice of separating action, it is immediate that
equilibrium separation must arise by taking costless actions.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that, at degenerate beliefs, the agent’s action cannot affect audience
beliefs and (by the Markov restriction), thereby cannot affect continuation payoffs. Thus, trivially, at any
degenerate belief, the agent switches to playing his costless action forever. Therefore, we are left with
six types of pure strategy equilibria that can arise at non-degenerate beliefs.
• Full Separation/No reputation: Agent types fully separate in equilibrium. Reputation plays no
disciplining role in such an equilibrium in the sense that the agent always takes the costless action
(as he would in a one-shot play of the game).
• Full Compromise: Both types of agents play only the compromise action (aM , aM ).
• Catering and Compromise: Both types cater to one audience and play the compromise action
to the other. There are two types of such an equilibrium; one where both types of agent pool on
(aL, aM ) and another in which they pool on (aM , aR).9
• Catering to Both Audiences: Both types play aL for the L-audience and aR for the R-audience;
that is both types pool by playing (aL, aR).10
8Off-equilibrium, of course, there is in principle considerably more flexibility in how beliefs can move; however, as we
argue below, standard forward induction intuition suggests that off-equilibrium beliefs would be degenerate.
9It seems reasonable to treat (aL, aM ) and (aM , aL) as identical as far as on- or off- equilibrium upating is concerned, in
the case of common observation. As will be shown below although there is a distinction between these action profiles under
separate observation, neither would arise in equilibrium.
10Again, under common observation we treat (aR, aL) as identical.
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• Catering and Separation: Types pool on catering to one audience by playing the favorite action
of that audience, and separate on the action to the other audience. There are two types of such equi-
librium. In one the catering is to the R-audience, so that θL-type plays (aL, aR) and the θR-type
plays (aR, aR). In the other, catering is to the L-audience so that the θL-type plays (aL, aL)and
the θR-type plays (aL, aR).
• Catering to Only One Audience: Both types pool by playing either (aR, aR), or (aL, aL).
Note that the first of these is fully separating, the next four are pooling equilibria, and the last involves
partial pooling. We refer the fully separating equilibrium as “non-reputational” since the agent would
play in the same way as in a one-shot game where reputation cannot be effective. Instead, the other
types of equilibria are “reputational” equilibria as they involve at least one type of the agent choosing
costly actions. We proceed by characterizing parameters under which each type of equilibrium arises;
highlighting how these differ depending on whether audiences observe the agent’s actions commonly or
separately.
3.1 Compromise
A key result in this paper is that with separate observations, there can be no equilibrium in which the
agent chooses the compromise action. On the other hand, with common observations, it is possible for
agents to choose the compromise action in equilibrium. The intuition is that, under separate observations,
an agent will always have an incentive to deviate to his costless action for the audience that prefers
this action. Such a deviation would increase the agent’s payoff from one audience without adversely
affecting the payoff from the other. It is worthwhile to point out that this intuition does not rely on the
use of pure strategies. Indeed, incentives are strict, and therefore even if we allowed for mixed strategies,
compromise would not arise in equilibrium with separate observations. The next two propositions state
these results formally.
Proposition 1 (No Compromise with Separate Observations). In a setting with separate observations,
there is no equilibrium with compromise.
Proof. Suppose that, there is an equilibrium in which, without loss of generality, an agent of type θL
chooses action aM with some non-zero probability. Under separate observations, regardless of the choice
of a2, deviating to a1 = aL gives the agent of θL a higher wage from L; i.e., wL(aL, aL) ≥ wL(aM , aL),
wL(aL, aR) ≥ wL(aM , aR) and wL(aL, aM ) ≥ wL(aM , aM ). This is immediate from the audience’s
payoffs. Moreover, playing aL is costless for him, and does not affect the future continuation payoff
from the R-audience. Therefore, θL will have an incentive to deviate to a1 = aL. This in turn implies
that the θR-agent never chooses a1 = aM either: Playing a1 = aM would reveal the θR-agent’s type to
the L-audience with certainty. But, the θR agent can separate costlessly by playing a1 = aR instead of
aM . An analogous argument shows that there is no equilibrium in which any agent plays a2 = aM .
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However, under common observations, it is no longer possible to deviate with one audience without
affecting the other audience’s beliefs. Indeed, now compromise can be chosen in equilibrium. To see this,
consider the strategy profile of full compromise, i.e., agents of both types pool on (aM , aM ). This can
be optimal if getting positive intermediate payments from both audiences is more valuable than getting
the highest payment from only one audience, relative to the cost of the compromise action.
Proposition 2 (Full Compromise with Common Observations). In a setting with common observa-
tions, suppose that
c ≤ δ(2m − 1).
Then, there exists an MPE in which, for all λ ∈ (0, 1), both types of agents play (aM , aM ). At λ ∈ {0, 1},
each type of agent takes her costless action.
Proof. Suppose that, at all beliefs λ ∈ (0, 1), agents of both types pool to play (aM , aM ), and at degen-
erate beliefs, agents choose their respective costless actions.Then, the equilibrium payments paid by the
audiences are given by:
∀λ ∈ (0, 1), wL(λ) = wR(λ) = 2m.
For λ ∈ {0, 1}, wL(1) = wR(0) = 2 and wL(0) = wR(1) = 0.
Given these strategies, we can derive the value functions of the two types of agents. For interior beliefs,
we have
VL(λ) = 4m− 2c + δVL(λ) =⇒ VR(λ) = VL(λ) = 4m− 2c
1− δ .
At extreme beliefs, VR(1) = VL(1) = VL(0) = VR(0) = 21−δ . Any deviation from (aM , aM ) will
change posterior beliefs of both audiences to an extreme (either 0 or 1, depending on the choice of off-
equilibrium beliefs). For the θL agent, the cheapest deviation involving play of aL is playing aL to both
audiences. So, for optimality, we need
−2c + δVL(λ) ≥ δVL(1) ⇐⇒ c ≤ δ(2m − 1),
which is true by the hypothesis of the proposition. It is easy to check that this condition also implies that
neither type of agent will deviate to (aL, aR). For the θR agent, the cheapest deviation involving play of
aR is playing aR to both audiences. For compromise to be optimal, we need −2c + δVR(λ) ≥ δVR(0),
which is identical to the condition above.
The parameter condition that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with compromise is quite intu-
itive. We get the natural comparative static that this equilibrium (like any other reputational equilibrium)
is easier to sustain with more patient agents. More importantly, the condition highlights that the equi-
librium is more likely to exist, the lower the cost (c) of taking the compromise action and the more the
compromise action is valued by the audiences (m). Note that, there is a sense in which concavity plays
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a role: Given the symmetry between the audiences, with a horizontal interpretation of the model it is
natural to think of aM as “half way” between the aL and the aR actions; the compromise equilibrium can
only arise if each audience values the compromise action at more than the average of its valuation for
the aL and aR action. This is a first hint that the “shape” of reputational incentives (which in turn derive
from the shapes of audience preferences and underlying cost technologies) plays an important role—we
return to this theme at some length below.
As we describe in Proposition A.1 in the appendix, “catering and compromise” equilibria can also
arise under common observation; however, whenever such an equilibrium exists, the full compromise
equilibrium also exists.
3.2 Catering
A second key result is that, catering is “harder” to sustain in equilibrium under common observations,
compared to separate observations. The intuition is that under common observation, catering to one
audience comes at the cost of alienating the other, whereas under separate observations an audience
would not observe whether or not the agent is catering to the other audience.
Formally, we show that it is not possible for agents to pool on the strategy of catering to both audi-
ences (playing each audience’s favored action (aL, aR)) under common observations. However, catering
to both audiences can be sustained under a wide range of parameters under separate observations.
Proposition 3 (Catering to Both Audiences Impossible under Common Observations). With com-
mon observations, catering to both audiences is not sustainable in equilibrium. Under separate obser-
vations, this can arise in equilibrium if C ≤ δ.
Proof. First, consider the environment with common observations. Suppose that there exists an equilib-
rium with catering to both audiences: At all λ ∈ (0, 1), agents of both types play (aL, aR) (or (aR, aL)),
and at degenerate beliefs, agents choose their respective costless actions. Then, the equilibrium payments
made by the audiences would be wL(λ) = wR(λ) = 1, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), and wL(1) = wR(0) = 2 and
wL(0) = wR(1) = 0. Further, at any λ ∈ (0, 1), the value functions of the agents would be
VL(λ) = 2−C + δVL(λ) =⇒ VR(λ) = VL(λ) = 2− C
1− δ .
At extreme beliefs, VR(1) = VL(1) = VL(0) = VR(0) = 21−δ . Any deviation will change posterior
beliefs of both audiences to an extreme. For the θL agent, the cheapest deviation that results in a contin-
uation payoff of VL(1) is playing (aL, aL). So, for catering to both audiences be optimal, we must have
−C + δVL(λ) ≥ δVL(1), which cannot hold for any positive cost C . Therefore, such an equilibrium
cannot exist.
Now consider the environment with separate observations. We show that it is possible to cater to
both audiences in equilibrium. We impose the following off-equilibrium beliefs: If the L (R)-audience
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observes a deviation, he assigns probability 0 (1) to the agent being of θL type. In an equilibrium with
catering to both audiences, the payments made by the audiences are as follows. For any (λL, λR) ∈
(0, 1) × (0, 1), wL = 1 = wR. Also, wL(0, λ) = wR(λ, 1) = 0 and wL(λ, 1) = wR(0, λ) = 1. For
interior beliefs, we have, for (λL, λR) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1),
VL(λ
L, λR) = 2− C + δVL(λL, λR) =⇒ VR(λL, λR) = VL(λL, λR) = 2
1− δ .
Similarly, we have:
VL(λ, 1) =
1
1− δ and VL(0, λ) =
1− C
1− δ and VL(0, 1) = 0.
Consider the incentives of the θL-type agent to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
Her payoff from playing (aL, aR) is given by −C + δVL(λL, λR). Her most profitable deviation is
potentially to deviate to (aL, aL). (To see why, note deviating on a1 = aL does not make sense, since this
reduces the wage from the L-audience and is costly. The cheapest way to separate is to play a2 = aL.)
The payoff from deviating to (aL, aL) is given by δVL(λL, 1) = 11−δ . It follows that for catering to both
audiences to be optimal, we require −C + δ1−δ (2− C) ≥ δ1−δ , which reduces to
C ≤ δ.
Analogous arguments for θR-type agent lead to the same condition.
The intuition of the above result applies to “catering and separation” equilibria as well. Under com-
mon observations, there do not exist any equilibria in which agents cater to one audience and separate
with the other. However, such equilibria can be sustained under separate observations as we show in
Proposition A.2 in the appendix.
The last type of pooling equilibria that remains to be analyzed are those in which agents cater to
only one audience, i.e. both types pool on either (aL, aL) or (aR, aR). We show in the the appendix in
Propositions A.3, that such equilibria do not exist. The intuition here is simple. By catering to a single
audience, the agent earns per-period wages of 2 from the audience that he caters to, and nothing from the
other audience. In the pooling equilibrium, this involves costs of 2C from one type of agent. However,
this type of agent could earn the same but at no cost by separating and catering to his own “natural”
audience at no cost.
3.3 Full separation
Just as it is harder to sustain catering under common observations, it is easier to sustain full separation.
Under common observation when the agent separates on even one of the actions (a1, a2) he demonstrates
to an audience that he is of the preferred type. For example, he can convince the R-audience that he is the
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θR-type and will play the (aR, aR) action. Instead, under the separate observations case, the R-audience
even if it assigns probability 0 to the agent being the θL-type may be unsure of L-audience beliefs and
may think that the agent will cater to the L-audience on the a1 task.
Proposition 4 (Full Separation Harder with Separate Observations). A fully separating equilibrium
always exists under common observations, Under separate observations, a fully separating equilibrium
exists if C ≥ 2δ1−δ .
Proof. Consider the environment with common observations. The only fully separating equilibrium is
for the θL-agent to choose (aL, aL) and the θR-agent to choose (aR, aR). We impose the off-equilibrium
beliefs, that after any off-equilibrium observation, the audiences assigns probability 0 to the agent being
of type θL, if they observe (aR, aR), and assigns probability 1 to the agent being of type θL otherwise.
The equilibrium payments made by the audiences are then wL(λ) = 2λ and wR(λ) = 2(1 − λ). The
equilibrium value functions are given by VL(λ) = 2 + δVL(1) and VR(λ) = 2 + δVR(0). In particular,
the value functions are identical at degenerate beliefs, i.e, VL(1) = VR(1) = VR(0) = VL(0) = 21−δ .
Any deviation would involve a costly action and would take audience beliefs to the opposite extreme
without any change in continuation payoff. Clearly, costless separation is optimal.
Let us contrast this now with the setting with separate observations. In a fully separating equilibrium,
the equilibrium wages would be wL(λ) = 2λ1−δ and w
R(λ) = 2(1−λ)1−δ . The best deviation would be for a
θL agent deviating to (aL, aR). This would give a payoff of −C + 2δ1−δ + 2δ1−δ . For full separation to be
an equilibrium, we require 2δ1−δ ≥ −C + 2δ1−δ + 2δ1−δ , which reduces to C ≥ 2δ1−δ .
3.4 Comparing Single and Multiple Audiences
We may want to ask whether the reputational effects that arise in our setting with two audiences also
arise in a setting with a single audience. A straightforward extension of our baseline model can be used
to answer this question. Assume that the payoff of the agent now depends asymmetrically on the beliefs
of the two audiences. In particular, suppose that ut = αwLt + wRt for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Here α < 1
captures the idea that the L-audience is less important in determining the agent’s payoffs compared to
the R-audience. This alternate formulation now makes it easy to compare the setting of two audiences
with that of one audience, by considering the extreme asymmetric case of α = 0. An analysis of this
extended model shows that the case of the single audience is similar to the case of separate observations
insofar as no form of compromise can arise. With a single audience “catering” emerges in the form of
catering to the single audience (if C ≤ δ ). With two audiences and separate observations, though there
are several kinds of catering that can arise, these are qualitatively similar.11 Non-reputational equilibria
also exist under some conditions (if C ≥ δ1−δ ). In this sense, the case of an audience with homogeneous
preferences is similar to the separate observations case.
11Note, however, these are not identical to the symmetric α = 1 case. For example, when α 6= 1 then an equilibrium with
catering to a single audience (that is, with both types of agent pooling on (aR, aR)) can arise.
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3.5 Welfare Implications
The equilibrium characterization highlights that, in the presence of two audiences, the agent’s behavior
depends critically on whether the agent’s actions are observed separately or commonly by the audiences.
Reputational incentives are qualitatively different in these two environments, and this leads naturally to
questions regarding welfare. Is there a particular environment that is preferred by the agent, and what
equilibria would he prefer? In Table 1, we summarize the parameter restrictions for the existence of the
different types of equilibria. We also compute the per-period ex-ante expected value to the agent, for
each type of equilibrium, which allows us to then make welfare comparisons.
Table 1: Summary of Equilibria and Equilibrium Payoffs
Equilibrium θL-agent θR-agent Per-period Separate Common
Type plays plays Expected Payoffs Observations Observations
Full Separation (aL, aL) (aR, aR) 2 C ≥ 2δ1−δ Always Exists
(No reputation)
Full Compromise (aM , aM ) (aM , aM ) 4m-2c X δ(2m− 1) ≥ c
Catering (aM , aR) (aM , aR) θL : 2m+ 1− c−C X δ(2m− 1) ≥ c+ C
and Compromise θR : 2m+ 1− c
(aL, aM ) (aL, aM ) θL : 2m+ 1− c X δ(2m− 1) ≥ c+ C
θR : 2m+ 1− c−C
Catering (aL, aR) (aL, aR) 2− C δ ≥ C X
to both audiences
Catering (aL, aR) (aR, aR) θL : 2−C δ(2− λ) ≥ C ≥ δ1−δ X
and Separation θR : 2
(aL, aL) (aL, aR) θL : 2 δ(1 + λ) ≥ C ≥
δ
1−δ
X
θR : 2−C
We find that the observability has important welfare implications. First, the agent prefers reputational
equilibria (whenever possible) under common observations. Second, he prefers to fully separate under
separate observations. Finally, if we compare all equilibria under separate and common observations, we
find that the agent most prefers the equilibrium with full compromise. Below, we establish these results
formally.
Corollary 1 (Full Separation Better than Reputational Equilibrium with Separate Observations).
Consider the setting with separate observations. Whenever feasible, the agent prefers the fully separating
equilibrium to any reputational equilibrium under separate observations.
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The proof follows in a straightforward way by comparing the agent’s per-period expected payoffs in
each equilibrium. To see the economic intuition, note that, since the compromise action is never played
in equilibrium, the maximal per-period payoff that the agent can possibly get is 2. This is exactly the
payoff that he receives in a fully separating equilibrium. Therefore, whenever feasible, the agent prefers
this equilibrium. If the cost of the undesirable action is not too high, then equilibria with catering can
arise; but these all involve at least one type of the agent taking a costly action, without any increase in the
payments from the audiences. This indicates, that under separate observations, the agent would actually
prefer the cost of his undesirable action to be high, so that he is not expected to cater in equilibrium.
We have the opposite result in terms of agent welfare in the setting with common observations.
Corollary 2 (Reputational Equilibria always better than Separation with Common Observations).
Consider the setting with common observations.
i) When “full compromise” is sustainable in equilibrium, the agent strictly prefers it to a non-
reputational equilibrium (full separation).
ii) When “catering and compromise” is sustainable in equilibrium, the agent strictly prefers it to a
non-reputational equilibrium (full separation).
iii) The agent prefers an equilibrium with full compromise to one with catering and compromise, when
both are feasible.
Proof. Let’s compare an agent’s payoff in a fully separating equilibrium with that in an equilibrium with
full compromise. An agent’s ex-ante per-period expected payoff is 2λ+2(1−λ) = 2 in a full separating
equilibrium, and−2c+4m in an equilibrium with full compromise. Now, full compromise is sustainable
only if C ≤ δ(2m − 1). In this parameter range, −2c + 4m is strictly larger than 2, thus making full
compromise preferable to full separation.
A comparison of the payoffs in an equilibrium with catering and compromise with those in an equi-
librium with full separation yields a similar result. An agent’s ex-ante per-period expected payoff is
2λ + 2(1− λ) = 2 with full separation, and the minimum per-period expected payoff for an agent in an
equilibrium with catering and compromise is −c − C + (2m + 1). Now, catering with compromise is
sustainable only if C + c ≤ δ(2m − 1). In this parameter range, −c − C + (2m + 1) is strictly larger
than 2, thus making catering and compromise in equilibrium preferable to full separation. A similar
comparison also shows that the agent’s payoff in a full compromise equilibrium is higher than that in an
equilibrium with catering and compromise.
Corollaries 1 and 2 together yield the unambiguous welfare result that, among all equilibria under
either separate or common observations, the agent’s most preferred equilibrium is “full compromise.”
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Corollary 3 (Full Compromise is the Best Equilibrium). Whenever feasible, full compromise is the
equilibrium that gives the highest payoffs to the agent, among all equilibria under either separate or
common observations.
Proof. We know that the compromise equilibrium exists, under common observations, whenever c ≤
δ(2m − 1). In this parameter range, it is easy to check that the payoff from full compromise, 4m − 2c,
is higher than 2, which is the maximal payoff obtainable in any equilibrium under separate observations.
These results suggest that there are two reasons for the agent to prefer common observation to sepa-
rate observation. First, Corollary 3 states that if full compromise is feasible as an equilibrium it gives the
highest payoff, and we have already established that it is feasible only if there is common observation.
Second, even if parameters, are such that full compromise is not an equilibrium (or if a different equi-
librium is selected), a similar argument shows that any feasible equilibrium under common observation
delivers at least as much payoff to the agent as the fully-separating, non-reputational equilibrium and
Corollary 1 argues that this is the equilibrium that delivers the highest payoff to the agent under separate
observations.
4 Two Period Model and the Role of Dynamics
So far, we presented an infinite-horizon model with multiple audiences, where agents can build reputa-
tions commonly or separately. We have shown that qualitatively different equilibria emerge. Since we
restrict attention to pure strategies, the learning process for the audiences is very stark on the equilibrium
path: Either they learn nothing (initial beliefs are unaltered), or their beliefs become degenerate. The
dynamics are not important in as far as the learning process is concerned. The reader may, rightfully,
wonder whether dynamics play any role in these reputational equilibria. Put differently, would the same
qualitative effects arise with two audiences in a two-period model?
Consider an environment in which the agent interacts with the two audiences for exactly two periods.
The other features of the setting are unchanged. We find, somewhat surprisingly, that the results of the
infinite horizon do not carry over.
Proposition 5. Consider the two-period version of our baseline model. Compromise cannot arise in
equilibrium either under separate or common observations.
The intuition behind the above result is as follows. It is immediate that in the final period, the agent
will take only costless actions. It follows that at the beginning of the last period wL(λ) = 2λ and
wR(λ) = 2(1 − λ). Consequently, in the first period, compromise cannot emerge in equilibrium: The
θR agent would prefer to costlessly separate and earn 2, rather than incur a cost to pool and still earn
2. Depending on parameters, however, catering equilibria under separate or common observation may
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emerge. The interested reader may refer to Proposition A.4 in the appendix for a full characterization of
the equilibria in the two-period model under separate and common observations.
Proposition 5 contrasts strikingly with the possibility of compromise under common observations in
the infinite-horizon (Proposition 2). This is surprising, since here, unlike in standard reputation models,
dynamics does not seem to play a role in the learning process. The resolution comes from observing that
in the infinite-horizon model the pooling “compromise” equilibrium, in effect acts as a commitment on
the part of the agent, to keep compromising. This commitment ensures that it is valuable for the both
types to pool on compromise, in order to maintain further compromise. Instead in the two-period model,
because of the terminal period, no such commitment arises.
At this point, it is useful to think about the agent’s continuation value as a function of its current repu-
tation. We refer to this equilibrium object as the “returns-to-reputation” function. In the infinite-horizon
model, with common observations, in the compromise equilibrium, the agent’s returns-to-reputation
function is non-monotonic in his reputation. In other words, it is optimal for the agent to maintain his
reputation at interior λ, rather than allow his reputation to become extreme. Instead, in the two-period
model, because of the agent’s inability to commit in the last period, the returns-to-reputation function is
monotonic (constant). This ensures that, even under common observations, the agent’s most preferred
action is to separate costlessly, and induce a degenerate posterior. It follows that only a catering or
separating equilibrium can arise. The feasibility of catering then depends on the cost of taking the less
desired, extreme action.
Dynamics therefore plays an important but subtle role here. In a dynamic setting (with common
observations), an endogenous interaction arises between the two audiences, through the agent’s choice
of actions. This payoff interaction of the audiences makes an intermediate reputation more attractive to
the agent than an extreme one. Put differently, the presence of multiple audiences in a dynamic setting
changes reputational incentives qualitatively, because it affects the curvature of the agent’s rewards as
a function of her reputation. This indicates that, if there were some exogenous complementarities in
the agent’s utility from the payments between the two audiences (thus making the agent’s returns-to-
reputation function non-monotonic), then we might see compromise arise in equilibrium even in the
two-period model. Indeed, this is the case: In Section 4.1 below, we make alternative assumptions
on how the agent’s payoff depends on the audiences’ payments. We see that with complementarities,
pooling and compromise can arise in equilibrium.
4.1 Direct Payoff Interactions
Consider the two-period model with two audiences and common observations. Suppose that there were
complementarities between the different audiences’ payments in the agent’s utility. In particular, we alter
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the agent’s payoffs from wL +wR to being
wL +wR + γ
√
wLwR.
Essentially, we introduce a term that allows for direct payoff interactions between the two audiences.12
Technically, this complementarity in payoffs implies that the second period return-to-reputation function
turns out to be non-monotonic in the agent’s reputation. Payoff interactions between different audiences
can arise fairly naturally: For example, in the organizational example of promotion, if either Director
(Finance or Marketing) can veto a promotion then the manager would need the support of both. Payoff
interactions also arise in the context of credit rating agencies (Bouvard and Levy, 2011; Frenkel (2011)
where if investors think that the agency is too lenient then issuers would not pay for ratings, and if instead
rating agencies are too tough that may put off issuers, so that the optimal common reputation may be
intermediate.
In Proposition 6 below, we show that higher complementarities in payoffs (high γ) makes pooling
equilibria more appealing under common observation—and compromise can arise in equilibrium. In-
stead, when payments from the audiences are substitutes (γ < 0) then reputational equilibria do not
exist. Analogous reasoning to Proposition 1 ensures that, under separate observations, there is no equi-
librium with compromise.
Proposition 6 (Compromise and Catering with Payoff Interactions). Consider the two period model
with common observations, in which the agent’s utility is given by wL + wR + γ
√
wLwR. Suppose that
the initial reputation is λ ∈ (0, 1).
• If γ√λ(1− λ) ≥ c, there exists an equilibrium with full compromise, i.e., pooling on (aM , aM ).
• If 2γ√λ(1− λ) ≥ C , there exists an equilibrium with catering to both audiences, i.e., pooling on
(aL, aR).
• If min{C, 2c} ≥ 2γ√λ(1− λ), there exists a fully separating equilibrium, i.e. θL-agent plays
(aL, aL) and the θR-type plays (aR, aR).
Proof. TBC. For separating equilibrium, we assume that beliefs following off-equilibrium actions are
degenerate, other than for (aM , aM ), (aL, aR) and (aR, aL) where we assume that no updating occurs).
Note that in contrast to Proposition 2, the feasibility of an equilibrium with compromise is totally
independent of its value m to audiences. Indeed such an equilibrium could arise here even if m where
negative. Here, compromise is merely one way to pool and may be a relatively cheap way to do so. The
12We impose symmetry for simplicity.
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possibility of pooling (either through compromise or playing the (aL, aR) action) is easiest when the
payoff interactions are greatest—this is where γ is high and where λ is closer to 12 .
At this point, it may be useful to clarify the relationship between our results and the literature on
reputation. The reader uninterested in the relationship with the literature can skip directly to Section 5.
4.2 Relationship to the literature on type-based reputation
The earlier literature on type-based reputation, starting with the work of the “gang-of-four” (Kreps et al.
(1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982)) and subsequently developed in Fu-
denberg and Levine (1989), Fudenberg and Levine (1992) focused on the incentives of an agent who
can take strategic choices over actions, and seeks to develop a reputation as a “commitment” type who
can only undertake a single action.13 Along the equilibrium path, the strategic agent perfectly mimics
the “Stackelberg” type whose action is most preferred (at least in perfect monitoring environments and
with sufficiently patient agents). The nature of the equilibrium is similar to the catering equilibria in our
setting, where different types of agent pool on the behavior preferred by the audience.
We also have compromise pooling equilibria arising in our setting, under common observations: In
these equilibria, the agent’s returns-to-reputation are maximized at an interior value leading the agent to
want to maintain an interior reputation. In this situation, the agent has an incentive to pool (on compro-
mise) in every period forever, because pooling sustains uncertainty about the agent’s type in the long run
by preventing any learning by the audience. Finally, we have separating equilibria: In an equilibrium in
which the agent has an incentive to separate, if he successfully separates, he has no further incentive to
take costly actions, and so reputation effects die out immediately.
This latter observation has nicely been made in Mailath and Samuelson (2001) in a model where
a “competent” strategic agent seeks to avoid a reputation as an “inept” type. Mailath and Samuelson
(2001) argue when the reputational concern is to avoid being seen as an inept type, a competent, strategic
agent can take an action that reveals himself as competent. By separating in this way, the agent will
convince the audience that he is competent. Having separated, there is no uncertainty about the agent’s
type and, there is no reason left for the agent to take costly actions.
Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and related work of Tadelis (2002) show that the possibility of trading
reputation can sustain the uncertainty that ensures that an agent keeps having to prove his competence.
Similarly, exogenous probabilities of type-changes can sustain the type uncertainty required for long-
lived reputation effects Holmstro¨m (1999), Phelan (2006). A subsequent literature has sought other
means to replenish type-uncertainty, either through exogenous factors (notably bounded memory in Liu
and Skrzypacz (2010) and Monte (2010) or endogenous mechanisms (team production and overlapping
generations in Bar-Isaac (2007), limited memory as a design choice in Ekmekci (2009) and strategic
13For useful overviews of the economic literature on reputation see Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008), Cripps (2006), Macleod
(2007) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
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choice to acquire historical observation in Liu (2011).
We contribute to this strand of the reputation literature by presenting a setting, without a Stackelberg
type, in which reputation effects would not arise with a finite horizon, but in which pooling incentives
can arise in the infinite horizon, In our environment, there is no need to (exogenously or endogenously)
replenish uncertainty about the agent’s type. Instead, the presence of audiences with heterogeneous
preferences can lead to a returns-to-reputation function that is non-monotonic, which implies that both
types of agent prefer to commit to an intermediate action. Pooling behavior over an infinite horizon
allows them to effectively do so.
5 Shape of Returns-to-reputation
A key theoretical insight that comes out of our analysis is that the existence of multiple audiences al-
ters reputation incentives because it affects the curvature of the agent’s rewards as a function of his
reputation. The natural next step would be to investigate, more abstractly, how the shape of the “returns-
to-reputation” function affects reputation in a general model. Discreteness in action choices and the
presence of two strategic types in our setting makes a general analysis cumbersome. In this sub-section,
we try to isolate the effect of the shape of the returns-to-reputation function on reputation incentives, by
analyzing a stripped-down model with no asymmetric information or dynamics. Simplifying along these
dimensions allows us to introduce more richness along other dimensions; in particular, we allow types
and actions to be drawn from a continuum, and allow for general reduced form returns-to-reputation
function.
5.1 Career Concerns and Shape of Returns-to-Reputation
Consider an agent whose type θ is normally distributed with mean µ and precision h. We suppose that
the agent holds this prior commonly with the audience: Thus, this is a classical “career concerns” model
a´ la Holmstro¨m (1999), rather than a signalling or reputation model. The agent can take an action a ∈ R
at a cost c(a), where c′(|a|) > 0 and c′′(|a|) > 0.14 The agent’s action, together with his type together
generate a (noisy) public signal s = θ + a+ ε where ε ∼ N (0, 1).
An audience observes the signal and uses it (together with its expectations about the agent’s equilib-
rium action) to form a posterior belief concerning the agent’s type. The agent then earns a payment that
depends on the audience’s belief about his type, i.e., he earns payment R(E[θ|s]).15 We call R(ν) the
returns-to-reputation function, as it captures the final agent’s period return to having a reputation ν. In
14Typically, modellers restrict attention to non-negative actions. However, we do not do this, since this would be a substantive
restriction in our context: For example, when a denotes a “horizontal” action, there is no natural interpretation or rationale for
such a non-negativity restriction.
15Note that since we fix the prior distribution and signal structure throughout, in equilibrium E[θ|z] is sufficient to charac-
terize the posterior distribution.
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general, the agent’s problem is to choose an action to maximize his expected return, i.e., he chooses a in
order to maximize Eε,θ [R(E[θ|s])]− c(a).
By assuming that the agent’s type is normally distributed, we can fully separate the effect of changes
in the mean prior from changes in the precision. Further, by assuming that the signal is additive in
ability, action and noise, we eliminate effects that arise technologically from the signal-to-noise ratio
varying with underlying ability. These features allow us to focus squarely on how the shape of the
returns-to-reputation function affects the strength of reputation incentives.
Proposition 7 (Optimal effort in the career concerns model). The agent’s equilibrium effort choice
a∗ satisfies
c′(a∗) =
1
h+ 1
∫
R′
(
µ+
x√
h(h + 1)
)
φ(x)dx. (1)
The interested reader may refer to the Appendix for a proof. At this level of generality, it still
requires a proof that a solution exists and is unique and in writing (1), we implicitly assume that R(.) is
differentiable almost everywhere. From here on, let us suppose that this assumption holds, and that there
exists a unique solution.
In the canonical case, the reward function is linear. Holmstro¨m (1999) presents such a model, where
the agent’s return is his expected productivity. With a linear reward R(.), R′(.) is a constant k. From
(1), it follows that c′(a∗) = k1+h . So, there is a unique equilibrium action that is independent of the
reputation (µ). The equilibrium action also decreases in h, the precision of the public signal.
Both these results rely critically on the linearity of the return function, and below, we show that these
results are overturned in case of a general concave or convex return function. It is no longer true that
reputation incentives always work in the same direction: In particular, R(.) may be non-monotonic and
the equilibrium effort can be positive or negative (based on the reputation).16
Proposition 8. Suppose that the second order condition holds and there is a unique differentiable solu-
tion a∗(µ) then a∗′(µ) > 0 if R(.) is convex, and a∗′(µ) < 0 if R(.) is concave.
We provide the proof in the appendix. It is easy to see that if agents know their own private type
then such returns-to-reputation functions might naturally lead to the kind of “compromise” and pooling
discussed in Sections 3 and 4.1.
16To see that effort need not be monotonic in precision, consider the case where R(x) = x for x ∈ (0, 1) but R(x) = 0 for
x ≤ 0 and R(x) = 1 for x ≥ 1. In this example, effort makes a difference only if the posterior lies in (0, 1). Suppose that
the prior is 1
2
. Then, high precision means the posterior is more often in the region where effort makes a difference to rewards;
instead, low precision, even though it means that actions will shift the posteriors to a greater extent, will often do so in regions
where this makes no difference to rewards. For a more complete discussion of how shape of the returns-to-reputation can lead
to non-monotonicity of incentives in precision see Miklos-Thal and Ullrich (2012). See Martinez (2009) for a specific example.
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5.2 Micro-foundations for shape
Since the shape of the returns-to-reputation function is critical for determining the strength of reputation
incentives, it is natural to ask what leads to a particular shape. Our work clearly shows that the existence
of heterogeneous audiences in a dynamic setting generates non-monotonicities in the returns to reputa-
tion. More broadly, as discussed in the context of the credit-rating agency example, non-monotonicity of
the returns-to-reputation function might be consequences of externalities that the audiences impose on
each other through their own choices of actions, or even as consequences of heterogeneous beliefs held
by the different audiences.
A comprehensive investigation of the micro-foundations for different returns-to-reputation functions
is (somewhat orthogonal to) and beyond the scope of this paper. But in this section, we make a small
digression: We present two examples of horizontal and vertical differentiation, that are well-understood
in the static environment, and we show that the reputation incentives that arise in these examples are
non-monotonic.
Example 1 (Horizontal Reputation). Suppose that a monopolist faces two consumers with different
preferences over a horizontal characteristic θ of the product. Consumer 1’s valuations of a product of
quality θ is given by v1(θ) = V −(1−θ)2, and consumer 2’s valuation is given by v2(θ) = V −(−1−θ)2.
We can think of consumer 1 having her bliss point of quality at θ = 1 and consumer 2 at θ = −1. Each
consumer can get a maximum value V from consuming the product, and suffers a quadratic loss from a
product whose quality is not at her bliss point. The monopolist considers three possible optimal strategies
(i) not to sell, (ii) sell to only one of the two consumers and (iii) sell to both consumers. It is easy to
see that the monopolist’s value of having a reputation ν is given by R(ν) = max{0, V − (−1 − ν)2 −
h−1, V − (1 − ν)2 − h−1, (2V − (−1− ν)2 − 2h−1) 1v>0 + (2V − (1− ν)2 − 2h−1) (1 − 1v>0)},
where 1v>0 is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if v > 0 and 0 otherwise. Given the returns-to-
reputation function, and taking a specific functional form for the monopolist’s cost function, it is easy to
calculate optimal effort. The figure below plots the monopolist’s return (on the left) and optimal action
as a function of the current belief about quality (for V = 3, h = 12 and quadratic costs). In a market with
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horizontal differentiation, the monopolist’s returns-to-reputation are non-monotonic. So, the optimal
action can display sharp reversals.
A simple application of this model is in advertising in a market with horizontal differentiation. A
firm can choose advertising to highlight some aspects of its product rather than others: By investing in
marketing an image, it can develop a “horizontal reputation.” A good example is the tobacco industry,
where relatively homogeneous products have been marketed to develop particular reputations.17 It is
noteworthy, that brands have entirely reversed their marketing strategies; for example, Malboro, associ-
ated with the “Malboro man” was originally marketed as a feminine brand to appeal to women.18 This is
consistent with our simple model where stochastic realizations might lead a firm to reverse the direction
of its branding.19
Example 2 (Vertical Reputation with a Rival of Known Quality). Suppose that a firm with uncertain
quality has to compete against an incumbent of known quality. The reward to establishing a particular
reputation can clearly be non-monotonic in the reputation, as there is a benefit to differentiating from the
incumbent. Depending on the prior, it may be beneficial to differentiate as a worse quality competitor or
a higher quality competitor. In addition, lower quality differentiation is limited since the firm prefers not
to appear so low quality as to lose credibility as a competitor.
This intuition can be illustrated by adapting a standard model of vertical differentiation, such as
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Shaked
and Sutton (1983). Suppose that a consumer of type t anticipates obtaining utility ts−p from consuming
a good of expected quality s and price p. Risk-neutral consumers vary in their tastes for quality t,
where t is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Suppose that there is incumbent whose quality is fixed at
1. By examining price-setting behaviour for the entrant and incumbent, and the associated profits for
the entrant, at each possible posterior belief about the agent’s type, it can be shown that the entrant’s
returns-to-reputation function is non-monotonic in the prior. Specifically, it is given by R(E(µ)) =

0 if E(µ) < 0
1−E(µ)
9 if 0 ≤ E(µ) < 1
4
9(E(µ)− 1) if 1 < E(µ)

. The figure below plots the optimal effort, when the precision
17As an example, see Vaknin (2007) who cites Alan Blum that “. . . the brand of cigarette of cigarette you smoked often
marked you as a fan of a particular baseball team: New York Giants fans would probably smoke a Chesterfield, a Yankee fan
Camels and Lucky Strike would be preferred by Dodgers supporters p.9.”
18See Vaknin (2007). “ Marlboro was originally produced by Philip Morris as a woman’s cigarette. They were advertised as
being ‘Mild as May’ for the female palate and had ‘Ivory Tips’ to ‘protect the lip’...quite a different image from the masculine
symbol it was to become...(p.45) Even in 1951, Philip Morris was using this particularly strange image of an adorable infant
with a baby-pink background to sell cigarettes to mothers... The early ’new’ Marlboro advertisements in 1954 pictures images
of men who typified ’masculine confidence’... Later the campaign was refined by the Leo Burnett advertising agency to the
image that was to endure all over the world for the next thirty years, the Marlboro cowboy and ‘Marlboro Country’. (p.69-70)”
19There is a related literature on advertising in markets with horizontal differentiation. In particular, Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) show that the market-determined level of informative advertising may be socially excessive, and that cheaper advertising
technologies may lead to more severe price competition and reduced profits. Anand and Shachar (2011) provide empirical
support for an informative rather than persuasive role for advertising, highlighting that, exposure to informative advertising on
a horizontal characteristic leads some consumers to reduce their demand for the good.
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h = 1 and cost of effort c(a) = a22 . Again, we see that not only can the optimal effort be non-monotonic,
but it can also switch direction depending on the prior.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we are interested in environments in which an agent builds a reputation with multiple au-
diences who have potentially opposed preferences. We ask how the presence of multiple audiences with
diverse preferences affects the reputational incentives for an agent. Further, we ask whether the agent
should deal with the audiences separately and build private reputations, or deal with them commonly
and build a public reputation. We find that the presence of multiple audiences gives rise to qualitatively
different reputational equilibria. Multiple audiences who commonly observe an agent’s actions lead the
agent towards pooling equilibria in which he takes intermediate, compromise actions rather than extreme
actions. Instead, with a single audience or with audiences who observe separately, equilibria involve
separation or catering to audiences by choosing extreme actions. Our analysis also highlights that the
existence of multiple audiences affects the reputation incentives, since it affects the way in which the
value of an agent’s reputation varies with his current reputation.
There are some natural extensions and robustness checks for the baseline model of Section 2. We
contrast common observation with separate observation, but we could also consider intermediate situa-
tions. Suppose that the L (R)-audience observed one action a1(a2) with certainty, and the other a2(a1)
with probability p ∈ (0, 1) (and there is perfect correlation in whether the two audiences observe one
or two actions in a period). Analysis of such an environment does not yield any qualitatively different
insights, and turns out to be a mixture of the two polar cases in this paper.
We have characterized pure strategy equilibria; however, note that our key result establishing the
possibility of compromise with common observations and the impossibility of compromise under sepa-
rate observations is true among all equilibria: pure and mixed. Characterizing all the mixed strategy is
not a trivial extension. In most mixed strategy equilibria, there will be (non-degenerate) learning on the
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equilibrium path, so that the equilibrium imposes conditions on all (or many) beliefs simultaneously, and
behaviors at different beliefs will interact.
In our baseline model, we restrict attention to perfect monitoring of actions. We do this mainly for
tractability: Perfect monitoring makes the learning process very simple, though extending the analysis
to allow for imperfect monitoring may generate additional insight. For instance, we can consider a more
general signal structure in which the agent’s actions generate signals y1(a1) and y2(a2). If the agent took
action a, with probability µ, the realized signal is correct (yi(a) = ai), and with probability 1 − µ the
realized signal is one of the other actions (with equal probability).
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A Additional Results and Proofs
Proposition A.1 (Cater and Compromise under Common Observations.). Suppose that
C + c ≤ δ(2m− 1).
Then, in the setting with common observations, there exist MPE with catering to one audience and
compromise with the other.
Proof. Consider a strategy profile in which agents cater to the R-audience and compromise with the
L-audience; i.e., at all λ ∈ (0, 1), agents pool to play (aM , aR), and at degenerate beliefs, agents choose
their respective costless actions. Then, the wages paid by the audiences are as follows: For any λ ∈
(0, 1), we have wL(λ) = m, and wR(λ) = 1 + m. For λ ∈ {0, 1}, wL(1) = wR(0) = 2 and
wL(0) = wR(1) = 0. For interior beliefs, we have
VL(λ) =
2m+ 1− c− C
1− δ , VR(λ) =
2m+ 1− c
1− δ .
At extreme beliefs, VR(1) = VL(1) = VL(0) = VR(0) = 21−δ . The most profitable deviation possible is
for the θL agent to play (aL, aL). For this deviation not to be profitable we need−C−c+ δ(2m+1−c−C)1−δ ≥
2δ
1−δ . This reduces to
C + c ≤ δ(2m− 1). (2)
The most profitable deviation possible is for the θR agent to play (aR, aR). For this deviation not to be
profitable we need c+ δ(2m+1−c)1−δ ≥ 2δ1−δ . This reduces to c ≤ δ(2m− 1), which is implied by (2) above.
We can similarly consider the strategy profile in which agents pool on (aL, aM ), and check that we get
the same condition.
Proposition A.2 (No “Catering and Separation” under Common Observations). i) With common
observations, there is no equilibrium in which agents cater to one audience, and separate with the
other.
ii) With separate observations, catering and separation arises in equilibrium. In particular,
• If δ1−δ ≤ C ≤ δ(2 − λ), then there exists an equilibrium in which the agents cater to the
R-audience and choose their costless actions for the L-audience.
• If δ1−δ ≤ C ≤ δ(1 + λ), then there exists an equilibrium in which the agents cater to the
L-audience and choose their costless actions for the R-audience.
Proof. First consider the setting with common observations. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in
which the agents cater to the R-audience, and separate with the L-audience, i.e. the θL-agent chooses
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(aL, aR) and the θR-agent chooses (aR, aR). The equilibrium payoff for the θL agent would be −C +
δ(1+λ+2(1−λ))
1−δ , and that of the θR-agent is
2δ
1−δ . In such an equilibrium, the types separate. However,
this cannot be optimal, because the θL-agent can separate costlessly by playing (aL, aL) instead. An
identical argument shows that catering to the L-audience and separating with the R audience can also
not arise in equilibrium.
Next consider the setting with separate observations. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in
which the θL-agent chooses (aL, aR) and the θR-agent chooses (aR, aR). Here, the best possible devia-
tion for the θL agent would be to choose (aL, aL). For this to not be profitable, we require
−C + δ
1− δ +
δ(λ + 2(1− λ)− C)
1− δ ≥
δ
1− δ ⇐⇒ C ≤ δ(2 − λ). (3)
Similarly, for the θR agent to not deviate to (aL, aR), we require
δ(λ + 2(1− λ))
1− δ ≥ −C +
δ
1− δ +
δ(λ + 2(1 − λ))
1− δ ⇐⇒ C ≥
δ
1− δ . (4)
If conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied, catering to the R-audience and separating with the L-audience is an
equilibrium. In this environment, it is also possible for the agents to cater to the L-audience and separate
with R, i.e., there exists an equilibrium in which the θL-agent chooses (aL, aL) and the θR-agent chooses
(aL, aR). Here, the best possible deviation for the θL agent would be to choose (aL, aR). For this to not
be a profitable deviation, we require
δ(2λ + 1− λ)
1− δ ≥ −C +
δ(2λ + 1− λ)
1− δ +
δ
1− δ ⇐⇒ C ≥
δ
1− δ . (5)
Similarly, for the θR agent to not deviate to (aR, aR), we require
−C + δ(2λ + 1− λ− C)
1− δ +
δ
1− δ ≥
δ
1− δ ⇐⇒ C ≤ δ(1 + λ). (6)
If conditions (5) and (6) are satisfied, catering to the L-audience and separating with the R-audience is
an equilibrium.
Proposition A.3 (No Equilibria with Catering to Only One Audience:). There does not exist any
equilibrium in which both types of agents cater to only one audience: In other words, pooling on (aL, aL)
or on (aR, aR) cannot be an equilibrium, under either separate or common observations.
Proof. Consider first the setting with separate observations. The result follows immediately from the
fact that an agent can deviate to playing her costless action for the audience that values that action. This
will increase her continuation payoff from that audience without affecting continuation payoffs from the
other audience.
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Next consider the case of common observations. Suppose that there existed an equilibrium in which
both agents pool on (aR, aR) (at all λ ∈ (0, 1)). Then, the payments by the audiences are wL(λ) = 2
and wR(λ) = 0 for any λ ∈ (0, 1). Any deviation from (aR, aR) will change posterior beliefs of both
audiences to 1. So, the only deviation we need to check is whether the θL agent wants to deviate to
(aL, aL). So, we need −2C + δ(2−2C)1−δ ≥ 2δ1−δ , which reduces to C ≤ 0, which is not possible.
Proof of Proposition 5: Proposition 5 states that no compromise is possible in equilibrium in the
two-period model, regardless of whether we have separate or common observations. We prove this by
directly characterizing all pure strategy equilibria in the two-period model. In particular, the proposition
below states that any pure strategy equilibrium must involve either separation or catering.
Proposition A.4 (Equilibria in the two-period model). In the two-period model. Under separate ob-
servations if the initial reputation is interior λ ∈ (0, 1); there is
• A fully separating equilibrium where θL plays (aL, aL) and θR plays (aR, aR), if C ≥ 2δ;
• An equilibrium with catering to both audiences, were both types play (aL, aR) if δ ≥ C;
• No other pure strategy equilibrium; and,
Under common observations, if the initial reputation is interior then there is
• A fully separating equilibrium where θL plays (aL, aL) and θR plays (aR, aR), if C ≥ δ;
• An equilibrium with catering to only one audience (where both types play either (aR, aR) or
(aL, aL)), if δ ≥ C;
• No other pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. We omit this proof. It follows mechanically, applying the off-equilibrium beliefs of Section 2.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. The audience’s posterior belief about θ following an observation s when the equilibrium action
a∗ is anticipated, is distributed normally with mean ν = hµ+s−a
∗
h+1 and precision h+ 1. Therefore,
Eε,θ [R(E[θ|z])] =
∫ ∫
θ,ε
R(
hµ+ θ + ε + a− a∗
h+ 1
)φθ(θ)φε(ε)dθdε (7)
=
∫
Y
R(
hµ + Y + a− a∗
h + 1
)φY (Y )dY , (8)
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where Y = θ + ε is normally distributed with mean µ and precision ( 1
h
+ 1)−1 = h
h+1 and φx(.) is the
normal density function associated with x. Using a change of variables, (i.e. x = Y−µq
h+1
h
, so dx = dYq
h+1
h
),
we express the above in terms of the standard normal distribution, denoted by φ(x).
Eε,θ [R(E[θ|z])] =
∫
x
R

hµ + x
√
h+1
h
+ µ+ a− a∗
h+ 1

 1√
2pi h+1
h
e−
x
2
2
√
h + 1
h
dx
=
∫
x
R
(
µ+
a− a∗
h+ 1
+
x√
h(h + 1)
)
φ(x)dx
When the first order condition applies, the agent’s maximization is the solution to
c′(a) =
1
h + 1
∫
R′
(
µ+
a− a∗
h + 1
+
x√
h(h + 1)
)
φ(x)dx (9)
Equilibrium effort is correctly anticipated. Setting a = a∗ yields the expression in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 8.
Proof. We can take derivatives of both sides of (1):
da∗
dµ
=
1
c′′∗)
d
dµ
[
1
h + 1
∫
x
R′
(
µ+
x√
h(h + 1)
)
φ(x)dx
]
=
1
c′′∗)
1
h+ 1
∫
x
R′′
(
µ+
x√
h(h + 1)
)
φ(x)dx,
which is clearly negative if R is concave and positive if R is convex.
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